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INTERSTATE INTERPLEADER UNDER THE
FEDERAL ACT OF 1936
ROBERT N. BURCHMORE*

A

BANK admits its liability on the deposit of a decedent, which is claimed, however, both by the executor
of the estate and the possessor of the passbook under an
alleged gift causa mortis. If the executor and the holder
of the passbook both bring actions to recover the amount
of the deposit, the bank suffers the unjust inconvenience
and vexation of two lawsuits for one liability. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that both juries may find against
the bank, thereby charging it with a double recovery.'
The purpose of the equitable remedy of interpleader is
to avoid, first, injustice to such a defendant as well as,
second, the possibility of further suits between such
claimants. By interpleading both claimants to the fund in
the same proceeding, the bank is permitted to withdraw
entirely, and the fund is left in court to be awarded to the
winner of the dispute between claimants. The device,
long established in equity jurisprudence, is one which
2
appeals strongly to the sense of reason and justice.
Where executor and passbook holder are residents of
different states, the problem is complicated by that ubiq* Member of Illinois Bar.
1 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291, 47 L. Ed. 480
(1903).
For other cases of unjust double recovery, see Chafee, "Interstate
Interpleader," 33 Yale L. J. 685, 718 (1924).
2 See Chafee, "Modernizing Interpleader," 30 Yale L. J. 815 (1921).
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uitous ogre, "Jurisdiction." 3 If the bank applies for
relief in the home state of the executor, he may find the
court powerless to bind the holder of the passbook; conversely, if suit is brought in the state of the latter.
Where the object of the controversy is a chattel or other
res, personal jurisdiction over the non-resident claimant
is not necessary and his rights may be determined after
service by publication and notice. Most often, however,
the res is a debt, and in such a case it is more difficult to
sustain jurisdiction in rem. The Supreme Court of the
United States finally decided, in New York Life Insurance Company v. Dunlevy,' that jurisdiction over the
debtor does not confer jurisdiction in rem and that a
judgment of interpleader in such a case without personal
service upon a non-resident claimant is not entitled to
full faith and credit.
Business, however, gives scant heed to political boundaries; and interstate transactions, breeding countless
situations which demand a convenient method of interstate interpleader, multiply rapidly. The foregoing example represents only one of many types of situations
creating the same need. The solution is one for Congress; state legislatures have no authority to extend the
jurisdiction of their courts extraterritorially, while Congress may readily give the district courts nationwide
jurisdiction.'
Furthermore, the system of interpleader practiced in
the United States courts is a flexible one, free from the
strict formal requirements which hamper litigants in
some of the state tribunals.0 Thus, soon after the decision of the Dunlevy case, the insurance companies, whose
business is one of the most prolific sources of situations
calling for interstate interpleader, obtained Federal legs Chafee,
4 241 U.
5 United
(1879).
6 Chafee,

(1932).

supra note 1, p. 697.
S. 519, 60 L. Ed. 1140 (1916).
States v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 25 L. Ed. 143
"I.nterpleader in United States Courts," 41 Yale L. J. 1134, 1137
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islation to that end.' Though highly successful,8 the act
which was passed was extremely limited in usefulness
by narrow restriction on the stakeholders to whom it was
available. Amended in the 19251 and in 1926,10 it has
now been supplanted by an act which attempts to provide
a simple and adequate system of interpleader for the
benefit of any stakeholder threatened by the claims of
citizens of different states."
The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the
problems arising under the act of 1936 and to comment
on the various provisions of the act. Recent cases displaying the efficacy of the act and suggesting new uses
of the expedient procedure it provides have been col2
lected and are here called to the attention of the reader.'
THE FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACT OF

1936

Where the benefits of the 1917 act were available only
to "casualty companies, surety or insurance companies,
or fraternal or beneficial associations," the present act' 8
7 39 Stat. 929 (1917).
8 Chafee, supra note 6, p. 1164; see also Chafee, "Federal Interpleader
Act of 1936," 45 Yale L. J. 963 (1936), at p. 965.
9 43 Stat. 976 (1925).
10 44 Stat. 416 (1926).
11 Infra note 13.
12 For an earlier discussion of the Act written soon after its passage, see
Chafee, "The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936," 45 Yale L. J. 963 and 1161.
18 U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, § 41, subd. (26).
"(26) Original jurisdiction of bills of interpleader, and of bills in the
nature of interpleader. (a) Of suits in equity begun by bills of interpleader
or bills in the nature of bills of interpleader duly verified, filed by any person,
firm, corporation, association, or society having in his or its custody or
possession money or property of the value of $500 or more, or having issued
a note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument of the value
or amount of $500 or more, or providing for the delivery or payment or the
loan of money or property of such amount or value, or being under any
obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more, if(i) Two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different States, are
claiming to be entitled to such money or property, or to any one or more of
the benefits arising by virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy, or other
instrument, or arising by virtue of any such obligation; and
(ii) The complainant (a) has deposited such money or property or has
paid the amount of or the loan or other value of such instrument or the
amount due under such obligation into the registry of the court, there to
abide the judgment of the court; or (b) has given bond payable to the
clerk of the court in such amount and with such surety as the court or judge
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contemplates bills filed by "any person, firm, corporation, association, or society." Thus, individuals and
corporations generally are entitled to the remedy where
they are threatened with claims by several claimants of
different states. Consistent with this broadened scope,
the act extends relief to the applicant which has issued a
"'note," "certificate," "or other instrument," or which
is "under any obligation written or unwritten to the
amount of $500 or more." It is not necessary that the
res be claimed in any particular form, that is, the cash
surrender value of an insurance policy may be sought by
one, while another claimant seeks to have the policy kept
alive, for claims "to any one or more of the benefits arising by virtue of any note ... [or] policy" are included.
may deem proper, conditioned upon the compliance by the complainant with
the future order or decree of the court with respect to the subject matter
of the controversy.
Such a suit in equity may be entertained although the titles or claims
of the conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but are adverse to and independent of one another.
(b) Such a suit may be brought in the district court of the district in
which one or more of such claimants resides or reside.
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of Part I of this title to the contrary,
said court shall have power to issue its process for all such claimants and to
issue an order of injunction against each of them, enjoining them from instituting or prosecuiting any suit or proceeding in any State court or m any
United States court on account of such money or property or on such instrument or obligation until the further order of the court; which process and
order of injunction shall be returnable at such time as the said court or a
judge thereof shall determine and shall be addressed to and served by the
United States marshals for the respective districts wherein said claimants
reside or may be found.
(d) Said court shall hear and determine the cause and shall discharge the
complainant from further liability; and shall make the injunction permanent
and enter all such other orders and decrees as may be necessary or convenient to carry out and enforce the same.
(e) In any action at law in a United States District Court against any
person, firm, corporation, association, or society, such defendant may set up
by way of equitable defense, in accordance with section 398 of this title, any
matter which would entitle such person, firm, corporation, association, or
society to file an original or ancillary bill of interpleader or bill in the nature
of interpleader in the same court or in any other United States District
Court against the plaintiff in such action at law and one or more other adverse claimants, under the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection or
any other provision of Part I of this title and the rules of court made pursuant thereto. The defendant may join as parties to such equitable defense
any claimant or claimants who are not already parties to such action at law.
The district court in which such equitable defense is interposed shall thereby
possess the powers conferred upon district courts by paragraphs (c) and
(d) of this subsection and by section 398 of this title."
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Under the earlier legislation the applicant was required to deposit the res in court before he could secure
a dismissal; this was extremely clumsy in such a ease as
that cited where the claimants seek different dispositions
of the policy. Accordingly, it is now provided that the
applicant may have the alternative of giving bond with
proper surety rather than depositing the res. The lowered jurisdictional amount of $500 is maintained in the
act.
The act retains the provision regarding process and
injunctions with only minor changes in wording. The
court is expressly empowered to issue its process for all
claimants and to issue an injunction against each of them
"enjoining them from instituting or prosecuting any
suit or proceeding in any state court or in any United
States court on account of such money or property. ... "
No provision is made, however, for the compulsory attendance of witnesses, and the general disability of the
courts to compel the appearance of a witness from a distance of more than one hundred miles extends to interpleader suits.
In the usual two-sided case the process of the court
does not extend beyond the geographical limits of the
district in which the court sits, and the rights of a party
can usually only be determined by the court in the district
where he resides. If he submits to the jurisdiction of the
court in another district, he does so voluntarily and may
be said to assume the responsibility of procuring his witnesses. With the process of the courts given nationwide
force, however, the claimant in interpleader may be taken
away from his home district against his will. In such a
case, unjust hardship may result if he cannot bring his
witnesses with him. A possible safeguard would be to
permit the court in this class of cases to compel the appearance of witnesses from any distance. To avoid injustice to the witness, who has no interest in the outcome
of the suit, his appearance ought to be compelled only
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upon a showing to the court that his presence is necessary to the party's case and will aid in the determination
of a vital issue, and that a deposition will not adequately
serve the need. Experience alone will indicate the need or
lack of it for such an amendment to the Act.
JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the district courts is extended to
bills of interpleader where "two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states, are claiming to be entitled to such money or property.... ,1 No mention is
made in the act of the citizenship of the applicant, and it
is plain that Congress meant it to be immaterial; the criterion for jurisdiction is the diversity of citizenship
among claimants. Thus co-citizenship between the applicant and a claimant would not affect the jurisdiction of
the court. Where some of the claimants are co-citizens,
however, the problem is less open. If there are only two
claimants, co-citizenship between them would be fatal apparently, but where only two of a larger number of claimants are co-citizens the meaning is not plain. Grammatically, it would seem that the phrase, "citizens of differ.nt.
states," should modify not only "two" but "two or
more" and that therefore each claimant must be of a
different state from every other claimant. That this construction cannot prevail, however, appears from the express words of paragraph (b), relating to venue. 15 It is
there provided that the suit shall be brought in the district "in which one or more of such claimants resides or
reside," indicating that Congress contemplated suits
where some of the claimants were from the same state.
If, then, the citizenship of the applicant is immaterial and
only partial diversity among claimants is required, the
act of 1936 thus embraces suits begun by bills of interpleader even where the applicant and two or more claim14 Supra note 13.
15 Supra note 13.
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ants are of the same state, so long as the disputed fund
is claimed by a single out-of-state party.
This broad construction accords with the purpose of
the act-to provide an adequate remedy in those situations in which the state courts are powerless to give
relief.16 For whenever a stakeholder is harassed by adverse claimaints of whom any is of a different state from
the others, there is need for the extended arm of the
United States courts to cross state lines. To limit the
courts more narrowly would be to leave a gap where the
stakeholder would be, if not completely helpless, at least
at the mercy of the mere chance that the foreign claimant
might voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of a state
court in order to expedite his own affairs.
Assuming that Congress intended as indicated, there
remains the possibility of constitutional difficulties. As
in any other class of cases, it is necessary in interpleader
that there be some constitutional grounds for the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Congress can confer jurisdiction upon them only within the ambit of its constitutional authority; and if the construction is broader than
the constitutional language granting jurisdiction over
"controversies between citizens of different states," it
may result in the fall of the statute, at least to the extent
that it exceeds those bounds.
The limits of that constitutional clause have never
been defined, and the Supreme Court has never held that
Congress could not confer jurisdiction even in the most
extreme case of a suit wherein only one of many coparties is a citizen of a different state from any one of
17
the
the others. However, in Strawbridge v. Curtiss,"
16 See report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senate Report 660, serial
6899, volume 3, first session 64th Congress, 1915-16:
"The bill seeks to cure an evil. The evil is the inability of the holder of
the fund, which is claimed by adverse claimants, who reside in different
states, to obtain proper relief in a tribunal .having jurisdiction over all such
claimants. Under the present judicial system, there is no such tribunal, and
therefore, no relief to the holder of such funds."
1? 7 U. S. 159, 3 Cranch 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (1806).
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Supreme Court decided that the then existing judiciary
act, in terms almost identical to the constitutional language,"' required complete diversity between adverse
parties, that is, that every plaintiff must be of a different
state from every defendant. This limitation has been
remorselessly followed" until it seems fundamental, despite the fact that it has never been ascribed to the Constitution. Its rigor has been somewhat lessened by the
practice of the courts in ignoring unnecessary parties
for the purpose of establishing diversity of citizenship.2 °
And the alignment of the parties in the pleadings may
also be altered to determine for purposes of jurisdiction
whether there is diversity between adverse parties in
interest.2 1 More important is the doctrine of separable
controversies, 22 by which a suit in which there is a separable controversy wholly between citizens of different
states may be removed to the Federal courts, for it was
held in Barney v. Latham2 that not only the separable
controversy but the entire suit is removable.
Interpleader presents a unique situation in this respect. It consists of two distinct stages, in either of
which may be waged a most bitter battle. In the first
stage the applicant seeks the order of interpleader and
may be strenuously opposed by either or both claimants.
In the second stage, the applicant has usually dropped
out and the fight between claimants is on.
Prior to the first interpleader legislation it was held
in Turman Oil Company v. Lathrop24 that complete diversity between the parties to the "preliminary controversy" over the order of interpleader was sufficient basis
for the jurisdiction of the court and the suit was per18 The statute read "the suit is between a citizen of the state where the
suit is brought, and a citizen of another state."
19 Dobie, Federal Procedure (1928), § 67.
20 Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 428, 47 L. Ed. 1122 (1903);
see Dobie, supra note 19, § 68.
21 The Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. Ed. 593 (1879).
22 Dobie, supra note 19, § 95.
23 103 U. S. 205, 26 L. Ed. 514 (1881).
24 8 F. Supp. 870 (D. Okl., 1934).
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mitted where the applicant was an Ohio corporation and
all of the claimants were Oklahoma citizens. Contrasted
with this case is the dictum of Judge Bledsoe in Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Lott,25 which involved a bill
framed under the first interpleader legislation: "The
controversy here is not between the insurance company
and the claimants. If so, the court obviously would be
without jurisdiction because some of the claimants are
citizens of New York, of the same state of which the
plaintiff itself is a citizen. Disregarding the formal and
looking to the substantial alignment of the parties ...
the real and seemingly only controversy in the case is
between claimants." These views seem mutually incon26
sistent, though each is supported by other cases.
By regarding the interpleader suit as made up of two
separable controversies, one the first stage of the case
and another between the claimants inter sese in the
second stage, the inconsistency may be dissipated. So
regarded, the existence of complete diversity as to either
controversy would be sufficient foundation for jurisdiction over the whole case under Barney v. Latham. This
harmonization gains strength from the fact that the
courts have apparently vacillated between the two stages
as to which is the "real controversy," indicating that
each has great significance, if not "separability."
The
27
reason for the failure of the courts to spin this theory
is historical. For the Lott case, first to establish the
jurisdiction of the Federal court based on diversity
among claimants, was decided under the first interpleader legislation, which expressly provided for suits
so framed. Prior to that time the Turman Oil case had
25

275 F. 365, 372 (D. Cal., 1921).

26 In connection with Turman Oil Co. case, see Knickerbocker Trust Co.
v. City of Kalamazoo, 182 F. 865 (1910).

See also Penn Mutual Life Insur-

ance Co. v. Meguire, 13 F. Supp. 967 (1936) following the Lott case.

27 It was held in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Allen, 134 Mass. 289

(1883), that interpleader does not involve separable controversies, but the
court considered only the possibility of separating the controversy between
the applicant and one claimant from that between the applicant and other
claimants.
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stood as law and no cases had suggested the possibility
of basing jurisdiction on diversity among claimants.
There was thus no need to resort to the separable controversy doctrine in the Lott case, since the statute was
prima facie justification for the apparent about-face and
no constitutional issue was raised.
However, in both the foregoing cases the necessity for
complete diversity of citizenship at one stage of the case
or the other was assumed. This has already been
pointed out as to the Turman Oil case; in Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Lott the court finally dismissed
the case for want of jurisdiction because there was not
complete diversity among claimants, one being a citizen
of the District of Columbia. Disregarding for the
moment the special question of the status of the District
of Columbia citizen,28 it is plain that the construction of
the present act already herein suggested would permit
jurisdiction in the situation of the Lott case, there being
partial diversity among the claimants. That case assumed the necessity for complete diversity within the
controversy under the applicable legislation; but it did
not go so far as to hold that the Constitution required it.
It has been argued by one writer2 9 that the court will not
follow the philosophy of Strawbridge v. Curtiss to the
extent of holding that Congress cannot constitutionally
extend the jurisdiction of the courts to the case of partial
diversity. The constitutional language permitting jurisdiction over "controversies between citizens of different
states" is at least grammatically satisfied if one party
to the controversy is of a different state from another."
28 The Lott case, following a line of Supreme Court decisions, held that a
resident of the District of Columbia is not a citizen of a state, within the
meaning of the Constitution and his presence as a necessary party defeated
the necessary complete diversity. Thus a resident of the District of Columbia could only be brought in if some basis for jurisdiction exists aside from
his residence. Under the construction here urged for the 1936 act, he could
be brought in if there were other claimants, citizens of different states.
29 Chafee, supra note 6, p. 1165.
80 Justice Bradley, concurring in the Removal cases, supra note 22, said,
"A controversy is such [between citizens of different states], as that ex-
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And the strict construction placed on similar statutory
language by Strawbridge v. Curtiss need not bind the
court in interpreting the Constitution. The practical
considerations definitely favor the broad construction
of the Constitution.
The demonstrated need for the jurisdiction conferred
by the act of 1936 is strong reason for a constitution
broad enough to embrace it. This need does not exist
in the ordinary two-sided case where the parties may be
heard in the state courts, and the likelihood of jealousies
where two concurrent systems operate is ample justification for strictly confining the jurisdiction of one. Without violence to language or reason, it is submitted that
the court may continue to construe narrowly the judicial
code generally as requiring complete diversity as to
"suits between citizens of different states" and as to
parties to "separable controversies" in the removal
statute, while here construing the Constitution to permit
what Congress plainly intended, that is, jurisdiction
based upon partial diversity of citizenship among claimants.
But if the requirement of complete diversity be held a
constitutional limitation, it may nevertheless be possible
to sustain jurisdiction despite partial co-citizenship
among claimants where within the case there is a separable controversy wholly between citizens of different
states.3 1 If, among claimants A, B, and C, there is a
separable controversy in which A opposes B and C, and
A is from one state and B and C from another, then
there is complete diversity as to that controversy and
pression is used in the Constitution and in the law, when any of the parties
on one side thereof are citizens of a different State or States, from that of
which any of the parties on the other side are citizens .... In other words,
a controversy may be, at the same time, both a controversy between citizens
of the same State and between citizens of different States."
81 In Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) decided
under the Act of 1927, a suit was permitted where the applicant was a cocitizen of the claimants and there was only partial diversity among claimants.
The court did not discuss the issue, however, and the case stands only as an
implicit assumption that the statute is not limited by Strawbridge v. Curtiss.
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jurisdiction over the whole case would be supported by
the doctrine of Barney v. Latham.
In the usual tort or contract case involving a separable
controversy the inquiry into the question of separability
is guided by whether the liability sought to be enforced
is joint, whether a judgment against the non-resident
defendant will affect the resident; if so, the removal is
not permitted. Thus, in Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Company v. Ide,82 individual defendants were not permitted to remove where several carriers made the contract of transportation upon which suit was brought
despite the presence of separate defenses. But in Barney
v. Latham, where heirs claimed the ancestor's interest in
land held by a corporation and also an accounting of
money received by other defendants in the same transaction, the individual defendants were permitted to remove on the theory that the land company was not a
necessary party to the dispute between the heirs and the
non-resident defendants. The requirement that the controversy be independent from the rest of the suit is not
relaxed though the whole case is removable and the independent controversy is not actually separated; the inquiry is thus hypothetical and seemingly serves only to
bring the case within the words of the removal statute,
which require that the controversy be determinable independently of the other parties to the suit."
In the three-cornered fight among claimants in the
case of interpleader, there is always a controversy between each claimant and the others. This follows from
the familiar equitable doctrine that the claims must be
mutually exclusive; A cannot interplead his butcher and
baker simply because he owes each $50. The success of
any claimant thus involves the defeat of the others, and
each claimant will be aligned against the others as to the
validity of his claim. If any claimant is a non-resident
2
3

114 U. S. 52, 5 S. Ct. 735, 29 L. Ed. 63 (1885).
See Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. 794 (1936).
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of the state in which the others live, then there is a controversy wholly between citizens of different states since
the validity of his claim is contested by citizens of another state. Whether this controversy is separable is the
troublesome question; it plainly is not independent in
the sense that a judgment for or against one claimant
will not affect the others, and the contract cases are not
helped. All claimants are grasping for the same disputed fund and the success of one will affect the others
inevitably; this characteristic unity of the interpleader
case forecasts a holding of non-separability.
However, a few cases permit removal where the object
of the suit is a res, and the disputes among claimants in
interpleader may be analogous. Thus, in a suit to quiet
title, defendants not claiming under a common source
were permitted to remove, 4 and in a suit on an assigned
claim one assignee defendant was permitted to remove
on the basis of a controversy with the plaintiff as to the
relative priority of their assignments.8 While it is to
be noted that in the first case the separable controversies
were all between the plaintiff and various defendants,
that is, between stakeholder and claimants, and in the latter case the controversy was between two claimants to
the same fund, the cases nevertheless stand for the
proposition that several adverse claims to a res present
separable controversies. In view of the freedom with
which the courts rearrange parties according to interest,86 it is not unlikely that the holding of these cases
will be applied in the interpleader cases.
The early cases under the 1936 act construe the act as
requiring diversity of citizenship among claimants,
though not complete diversity. In Worcester County
84 Carothers v. McKinley Mining and Smelting Co., 116 F. 947 (Nev.,
1902); McMullen v. Halleck Cattle Co., 193 F. 282 (1910); Connell v.
Smiley, 156 U. S. 335, 39 L. Ed. 443 (1895).
85 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 68
L. Ed. 629 (1923).
36 Supra note 20.
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Trust Company v. Long, 7 jurisdiction was taken over a
bill of interpleader where the stakeholder was a cocitizen of several claimants; the co-citizenship of some
of the claimants did not affect the jurisdiction of the
court in that case. Likewise, it is to be noted that the
citizenship of the stakeholder is immaterial. In the
Worcester case, the co-citizenship of the stakeholder did
not affect the jurisdiction of the court adversely; and in
Eagle, Starr & British Dominions v. Tadlock,8 it was
held conversely that where all of the claimants to the
fund were co-citizens, the complainant's alienage could
not supply the absent jurisdictional factor required by
the act.
The constitutional issue has not been raised and the
validity of the act has been assumed. Since it is difficult
to state a case in which the act would create hardship
because of its jurisdictional provisions, it is likely that
litigants will have no motive for attacking it and the
issue will remain quiescent. The cases do, however,
crystallize the interpretation urged, namely, that partial
diversity among claimants is a sufficient, but absolute,
prerequisite to an original bill under the act.

Is THE PRESENT ACT ExcLusIvE?
The Eagle, Starr & British Dominions case immediately
raises the question as to whether the present act of 1936
is exclusive, that is, whether it precludes the framing of
interpleader bills under traditional equity jurisdiction.
The Eagle case expressly disapproves the Turman Oil
case, decided before the earliest Federal Interpleader
Statute, which permitted suits framed under traditional
equity jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship
between the stakeholder and claimants. In dismissing
the case for want of jurisdiction, the court further de-

clined to follow the doctrine of the Turman Oil case. It
87 14 F. Supp. 754 (Mass., 1936).
88 14 F. Supp. 933 (Cal., 1936).
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held that the present act is exclusive and that such an
interpretation would allow one form of interpleader
under general equity principles based upon diversity of
citizenship as between stakeholder and claimant and
another form under the statutes in cases involving diversity of citizenship among claimants with a jurisdictional minimum of $3,000 in the former and $500 in the
latter, a result which the court regarded as not within
the intention of Congress. It was never contended that
the earlier and restricted acts were exclusive; they were
palpably otherwise.89
The present act contains no language which might be
construed as depriving the courts of their general equity
jurisdiction over bills of interpleader. It does, however,
have very nearly universal applicability, and some reason exists for the view of the California court that Congress did not intend to permit the existence of two very
different methods of interpleader. The only situation
not covered by the broad jurisdictional provisions of the
present act is that of the Turman Oil case, where all
claimants are co-citizens with an out-of-state stakeholder.
To such a stakeholder the only advantage in being able to
frame his bill under the 1936 act would be the availability
of the liberal method employed by that act, for in such
a case he would be able to interplead all claimants in
their state courts. The expressed purpose of the Federal
act"0 would not demand the inclusion of such a bill, whatever real practical advantage might be gained thereby;
and the holding seems correct. The case has no nationwide binding effect, however, and other jurisdictions
may not share the view of the California court, which
permits interpleader suits framed according to traditional equity doctrines, under the general diversity
89 In Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Meguire, supra note 26, the Turman case was followed despite the presence of the Act of 1917 and the suit
was permitted though all claimants were from the same state. See also
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Yaw, 53 F. (2d) 684
(N. Y., 1931).
40 Supra note 16.
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jurisdiction. The applicant in such a case will enjoy the
benefit of the greater power of the court under the Interpleader Act of 1936, if he pleads his case under (e), as
will be seen in the next topic hereof.
INTERPLEADER AS A DEFENSE AT LAW

Since the Federal Conformity Act does not apply to
equitable forms and proceedings, which follow equity
principles unless modified by Acts of Congress or Rules
of Court, it has generally been thought that state statutes
permitting equitable defenses in actions at law do not
aid the defendant in a Federal court who wishes to interplead. 1 And even under Section 274b of the Judicial
Code permitting equitable defenses in actions at law the
court in Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical
Company' refused to allow interpleader by way of defense despite respectable authority to the contrary.4 8
However, in Liberty Oil Company v. Condon National
Bank4 the Supreme Court permitted the interposition
as a defense in an action at law of an answer which presented a claim for interpleader.
B y section e). of he 19036 actb i Is expressly provided
that any defendant in an action at law in a district court
may "set up by way of equitable defense in accordance
with section 274b" any matter which would entitle such
person to file an original or ancillary bill and the court
shall have the powers conferred in the other sections of
the act. Aside from the implied approval of the Liberty
Oil Company case, removing all doubt as to the propriety
of interpleading in a law action, section (e) suggests the
possibility of obtaining relief under the act in situations
where an original bill could not be framed thereunder.
The Federal courts have general equitable jurisdiction
41 Chafee, "Interpleader in the United States Courts," 42 Yale L. J. 41,
45 (1932).
42 247 F. 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
43 See Chafee, supra note 8, cases cited p. 988.
44 260 U. S. 235, 67 L. Ed. 232 (1922).
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of a bill of interpleader regardless of the presence of the
requisite diversity of citizenship where such bill is ancillary to a cause pending therein;15 the bill may be
ancillary to the proceeding at law on the theory that the
interpleader comes within the court's jurisdiction over
its own process and record.4 Thus, where an Illinois
stakeholder is sued in the district court in Illinois by one
of two New York claimants, he may be allowed to interplead under the act. 7 An alternative theory supporting
interpleader as a defense in such a case is found regarding the defense as a matter which would entitle the
applicant to interpleader in an original suit framed
under the ruling in the Turman Oil Company case. The
fact that in such a case he might have interpleaded in the
New York courts or in the Federal court in New York
does not render this opportunity unimportant, for there
is substantial advantage in the simpler method of litigation at home in the initial suit with the protection of the
greater power of the Federal court under the act.
VENUE

Under the act, suits "may be brought in the district
court of the district in which one or more of such claimants resides or reside." This represents a vast simplification of the detailed venue provision of the 1917 act as
amended in 1926,8 which caused needless litigation and
was finally tacitly shelved in favor of a construction
similar to the express words of the present provision. 9
The use of the word "may" makes the provision one
regulating venue rather than jurisdiction, which may
thus be waived by the parties.5 0 Opportunity may be
45
46

Dobie, supra note 19, § 84.

Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., supra note 42.

47 This procedure has been suggested by the framers of the act.

See
Senate Rep. No. 558 on S. 1277, 74th Congress, 1st Sess.
48 U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, 9, 41 (26).
49 Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Adamson, 24 F. (2d) 107 (D. C.
Tex., (1928) ; Bankers' Life Co. v. Ebbert, 48 F. (2d) 907 (D. Pa., 1928).
50 Commercial Casualty Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U. S. 177, 73

L. Ed. 252 (1929).
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afforded for the relief of hardship to a distant claimant
through the exercise of discretion in entertaining suits
admittedly within the jurisdiction of the court. As has
been previously suggested, a California claimant cannot
have compulsory attendance of his witnesses in New
Jersey and great hardship may result if he were required
to interplead there, while circumstances might be such
that it would entail little trouble for the New Jersey
claimant to go to California. If the New Jersey court
may decline to hear the case, it may be possible to avoid
injustice by sending the parties to a more convenient
forum. This course has been followed in other types of
51
litigation.
The most usual basis for refusing to entertain the suit
has been an alleged burden on interstate commerce
through litigation vexatiously brought in an appropriate forum, though in Canada Malting Company v. Paterson Steamships52 the court refused to exercise jurisdiction on the broader ground of fairness to the best interests of the parties. Mr. Justice Brandeis there said, "Obviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction
must exercise it is not universally true ... courts of equity
and of law also occasionally decline, in the interest of
justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between
aliens and citizens or non-residents, or where for kindred
reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal." Such an administration
under the present act has been counseled also by Professor Chafee, whose work in this connection has been
outstanding.5"
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

The principal function of the act is plainly jurisdictional; it provides for relief by interpleader in situations
51

Consult J. Dainow, "The Inappropriate Forum," 29 Ill. L. Rev. 867

52
53

285 U. S. 413, 76 L. Ed. 523 (1932).

(1935).

Chafee, supra, note 6, p. 984.
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not formerly within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts
but does not substantially affect the nature of the remedy
as previously administered. Certain provisions, however, have some significance in this respect.
The act includes not only suits begun by the so-called
"strict" bill of interpleader but also suits commenced
with a bill "in the nature of a bill of interpleader." Such
bills are familiar to equity jurisprudence where there is
some other special ground for equitable relief in addition
to the double vexation, such as fraud or the administration of a trust. Their principal importance lies in the
fact that relief may be had thereunder despite interest
in the disputed fund on the part of the applicant, which
interest would bar a strict bill." By including them in
the act it was sought to avoid possible confusion of the
two types with consequent narrowing of jurisdiction.5 5
Bills otherwise meritorious have often met defeat in
the state courts because of a rigid formal requirement
of privity among claimants, the theory being that to
permit a bill where one claimant sues under a paramount
title would be to assume the right to a court of equity to
try mere legal titles. Another requisite which served to
defeat the just administration of interpleader was the
requirement that all claimants assert a right to the same
identical fund or res. This requirement was apparently
a misconception of the more flexible and more reasonable
requirement that the claims be mutually exclusive, that
is, that the success of one claimant involves the defeat of
all the others. As has been pointed out, the act contemplates cases wherein the claimants seek not the identical
thing, but different dispositions of the disputed policy or
debt. To forestall any possibility of adoption by Federal
judges of the above rules prevailing in the states in
which they sit,56 the act provides that the suit may be had
Chafee, supra, note 2, p. 839; Chafee, supra, note 8, p. 970.
55 Supra, note 48.
56 Supra, note 48; Chafee, supra, note 8, p. 828.
54
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although' the "claims do not have a common origin, or
are not identical .... "
1936 ACT
The recent case of Worcester County Trust Company
v. Long5 7 illustrates the usefulness and breadth of scope
of the act of 1936. The complainant in that case was the
executor of an estate which included intangible personal
property located both in California and in Massachusetts.
The will had been admitted to probate in Massachusetts
and ancillary proceedings instituted in California; each
state asserted a right to assess inheritance taxes based
on the contention that the testator had died domiciled
therein. The executor was thus faced with the dilemma
of the executor for the Dorrance Estate who was finally
obliged to pay both Pennsylvania and New Jersey inheritance taxes, assessed upon a similar basis. In that
case each state exercised for itself the right to decide the
jurisdictional question of domicile, and every attempt to
force a consistent solution upon them was in vain. 58 To
escape a similar outcome the executor in the Worcester
County Trust Company case filed a bill of interpleader
framed under the 1936 act, interpleading the tax authorities of Massachusetts and California. The court held that
such a proceeding was not repugnant to the Eleventh
Amendment prohibiting Federal jurisdiction of a suit
against a state. It further held that the obligation to pay
taxes was an obligation within the meaning of the Interpleader Statute and that the executor was entitled to
interplead as he did. Thus, the possibility of double taxation was avoided by determining once and for all the
question of domicile in a single proceeding.2
DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE

57 Supra, note 37.
58 In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932);

Hill v.
Martin, 12 F. Supp. 746 (1935), affirmed, 296 U. S. 393, 80 L. Ed. 293
(1935).
59 See case notes 15 CHICAco-KENT REVIEW 41 (1936) and 31 Ill. L. Rev.
(1936). The course followed by the executor in the Worcester County
Trust Company Case may have been suggested by Professor Chafee's article in 45 Yale L. J. 1161 (1936).
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Certiorari was denied" by the Supreme Court, but on
March 15, 1937, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit handed down an opinion 1 reversing the decision
of the District Court. The Circuit Court held that as
long as the state tax statutes were constitutional and as
long as the tax officials were not violating the respective
laws of their states, the tax officials were acting in their
official capacity and, therefore, that the proceeding was,
in effect, one in which the states themselves had been
interpleaded. Despite ample case material to support an
argument and decision upholding the view of the District
Court,6 2 the court thought this bill within the prohibition
of the Eleventh Amendment. The case is plainly one
within the broad purposes of the Interpleader Statute;
for it involves an illegal double recovery which is made
possible only by the inconsistent findings of fact-finding
bodies in two states. Therefore, to include it within the
constitutional scope of the Interpleader Statutes would
seem desirable. And there seems to be no contrary practical disadvantage in construing the Eleventh Amendment to permit such suit. It is predicted by the writer
that future bills of a similar nature in other jurisdictions
will fare better and that this decision will not stand.
60

Riley v. Worcester County Trust Co., 57 S. Ct. 29, 81 L. Ed. 34 (Oc-

tober 12, 1936).
61 Riley, Controller of Calif. v. Worcester County Trust Co., 89 F. (2d)
59 (1937).
62 See case notes, supra note 59.

